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DEFECTS IN CONSENT AND DIVIDING THE BENEFIT
OF THE BARGAIN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
I. INTRODUCTION
Contract law professors, students, attorneys, and judges know that
discussions about consent are rarely about consent. This results from three
factors. First, it is the appearance of consent that is necessary to form a
contract.1 Second, not every manifestation of consent is sufficient to create
a contract that cannot be avoided.2 Third, interpretations of consent have
the potential to allow courts to intervene when the benefit of the bargain is
seen to be unfairly divided or one of the parties is actually worse off as a
result of the contract.3 This Article assesses the extent to which recent court
decisions about consent are actually indirect means of addressing unfairness
with respect to the terms of the exchange.4 Part of the reason for focusing
on more recent cases is that it is possible that the doctrine of
unconscionability has replaced more traditional theories as a means of
addressing questions of fairness.
The proposition that questions of consent are not really about consent
may seem extreme, but think about various contexts in which consent
occurs. First, A makes an offer to B: “I promise not to harm you if you will
hand over your wallet.” B readily consents because he prefers his health to
whatever is in his wallet. Second, A, a poorly educated person who grew up
in poverty, agrees to buy a car at a price that is $5,000 more than the least
that the salesperson would have accepted. A consents because he has grown
up in a social or racial group of people who have been systematically
exploited. He has no idea that a lower price is available and views the price

* Stephen C. O’Connell Chair and Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law.
1
Under the so-called “objective” theory of contracts, the parties need not actually consent as long
as a reasonable person would regard their actions as signifying consent.
2
There are a number of doctrines that permit avoidance of a contract. See infra Part V.
3
In this sense it is important to note that contracts typically create a benefit of the bargain. This is
the total gain or increase in utility resulting from the exchange. When the parties actually decide on a
price, they are deciding how to divide up that benefit. In effect, they both must agree that the gain is
divided equitably. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed
Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243 (1948).
4
As will be explained, this effort involves an informal, empirical examination of cases from the
last ten years.
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as fair because it compares favorably to the prices people he knows have
paid.5 Third, A, a well-educated and careful person, buys a smoke alarm at
the market price.
All three examples involve “consent.” They differ, however, in the
factors influencing consent and, thus, whether there is consent for contract
formation purposes. What the examples suggest is that, when assessing
consent, courts engage in a process of creating rules and boundaries with
respect to acceptable forms of persuasion.6 They legitimize some forms of
persuasion and delegitimize others. What is legitimate or not may vary
with time.7 The range of possible outcomes, and the lack of objective
limits, have benefits and costs. The costs arise from the instability created
by an ever-changing list of what is acceptable or not acceptable. The
benefit is the opportunity for courts, which officially do not examine the
adequacy of consideration, to do exactly that and respond to substantive
outcomes. Thus, whether any manifestation of consent is viewed as
“contractual consent” may be a function, ultimately, of the way in which the
gains from contract formation are shared. The focus of this Article is to
assess the impact of the perceived unfairness of an exchange on decisions
that the consent itself was not legitimate.
So-called “defects” in consent, or more accurately a sample of the rules
that govern legitimate manifestations of consent, are examined. There are
many doctrines available under which defects may be identified. These
range from instances in which minors enter into contracts to cases of
material misrepresentation and fraud.8 This Article focuses on three
specific possibilities: capacity, duress, and undue influence. These three

5

Under the theory of relative deprivation, the satisfaction one feels about an outcome depends on
the outcomes of members of specific reference groups. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,
Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445, 460–62 (1994). See generally Faye
Crosby, Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and Halligan, 73 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 103 (1979); Ted Robert Gurr, Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative
Evidence, 391 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 128 (1970); William H. Panning, Inequality, Social
Comparison, and Relative Deprivation, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1983).
6
See generally Orit Gan, Contract Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171
(2013); Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 57 (2012).
7
The addition of volitional impairment reflects one such change. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 15 (1981).
8
One of the best known cases is Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968), in which a Florida court came to the assistance of what it described as a “a widow of 51 years”
who had purchased an excessive number of dance lessons under the theory that there was a
misrepresentation by instructors with respect to her ability to become an accomplished dancer. Id. at
907–09.

2015]

Defects in Consent and Dividing the Benefit of the Bargain

195

were selected because they seem to afford courts the most flexibility. I
concentrate principally on decisions by courts, but in Part VII, I return to
the importance of statutory law.9 In fact, as far as policing the limits of
exchanges, statutory law may be more important. The objective here,
however, is to assess whether applications of these doctrines in recent cases
are sub rosa efforts to address concerns about the balance of the bargain.
As will be evident in the discussion to follow, a complicating factor is the
rise of the use of the doctrine of unconscionability. Reliance on
unconscionability has the potential to make claims based on capacity,
duress, and undue influence obsolete.
The organization is as follows. Part II provides support for the general
belief that contract law can and should be applied to achieve outcomes that
are fair, and examines the relationship of this belief to unconscionability.
Part III expands on the importance of “consent,” describes the informal
methodology employed in this Article, and states the hypothesis to be
tested. Part IV briefly discusses the difficulty of determining what is meant
by consent and the critical connection between consent and preferences.
Part V sets out the black letter law with respect to each doctrine as found in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Part VI then concentrates on how
capacity, duress, and undue influence have been employed in the process of
legitimizing and delegitimizing, and more importantly, in placing limits on
the terms of an exchange. Part VII summarizes the findings and explores
whether much of the work done by investigations of capacity, duress, and
undue influence has been taken on by applications of unconscionability. It
also notes the importance of statutory measures in terms of achieving
distributive goals.
Four preliminary points should be noted. First, the remarks that follow
are not intended to suggest that there are “true” cases of incapacity, duress,
and undue influence, and then “faux” cases in which they are
disingenuously applied to rescue those who find themselves on the
unfavorable end of a bargain. It is possibly more generous and correct to
say that when a case is a close one with respect to capacity, duress, or
undue influence, notions of equity may come into play. Second, the
findings and some of the discussion may reflect no more than my own
biases and limitations. Except for cases related to specific research

9

This law includes cooling-off periods, limits on pricing, and disclosure requirements, to name a
few. I do not include the U.C.C. art. 2 (2003) or the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983),
1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988). Although “statutory,” they do not fit the general
description of laws designed to protect the less powerful.
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projects,10 I am personally most familiar with contract cases found in
teaching materials. I was surprised at the extent to which the cases in those
contexts are often not representative of actual disputes,11 but this may
simply be a result of expectations formed by years of exposure to casebook
selections. Third, another surprise was the number of what I thought were
“easy” cases that were still appealed or in which a particular argument was
made at all.12 In many instances, if a law student had responded to an exam
question by making the same argument, his or her grade would have been
low. Finally, as already noted, the relevance of any of the traditional
doctrines that address consent—capacity, duress, etc.—may be waning.
This is considered at the end of this Article.13
II. CONTRACT LAW AS A LEVELING TOOL
It is, of course, no secret that courts use a number of contract doctrines
to achieve what are perceived as fair outcomes. One of the starkest
reminders of this is found in the comments to section 2-302 of the U.C.C.:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police
explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be
unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and
acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy
or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to
allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its

10

See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Influence of Law and Economics Scholarship on Contract
Law: Impressions Twenty-five Years Later, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (2012); Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73 (1988).
11
This is a different matter than whether they are accurate in terms of describing the law or how it
should be applied.
12
There are many examples of what I mean by “easy.” One that is simple to explain involves a
non-compete clause signed when the employee, the holder of a Master of Science in Construction
Science, was hired by an environmental consulting firm. Singh v. Batta Envtl. Assocs., Inc., No. Civ.A.
19627, 2003 WL 21309115, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2003). It was the same clause agreed to by dozens
of other employees. Id. at *5. While employed, the employee did, in fact, open his own firm in
competition with his employer. Id. at *1. When the non-compete clause was raised, the employee
claimed that he was under duress when he signed it because if he had not taken the job, he would have
had to go back to India. Id. at *5. He also claimed that he was unduly influenced because he had a prior
relationship with the employer, and it would have been “awkward” not to sign whatever was requested.
Id. at *6. Both arguments were rejected, but I suspect the attorney still collected his or her fee.
13
See infra Part VII.
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unconscionability.14

Thus, the inclination of courts to inject notions of fairness into their
opinions seems to be a part of the general understanding of how contract
law is applied. The actual sections on unconscionability in both the U.C.C.
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Second Restatement”)15
reduce the pressure on courts to interpret more conventional contract rules
in order to achieve desired ends.16 In fact, the two prongs of the
unconscionability test—substantive and procedural—seem to fit most cases
of defects in consent.17 As a Pennsylvania court explains:
[A] contract or term is unconscionable, and therefore avoidable, where
there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of the challenged
provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting it. The
aspects entailing lack of meaningful choice and unreasonableness have
been termed procedural and substantive unconscionability, respectively.
The burden of proof generally concerning both elements has been
allocated to the party challenging the agreement, and the ultimate
determination of unconscionability is for the courts.18

This view connecting unconscionability to defects in consent is actually
quite old. As early as 1889, the United States Supreme Court observed that
a contract was unconscionable if it was “such as no man in his senses and
not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair
man would accept on the other.”19
These comments about unconscionability, while supporting the view
that courts do intervene to assist disadvantaged parties, lead to a sticky
question for this particular undertaking: Why not have only
unconscionability as the safety valve? The procedural requirement of
unconscionability would seem to encompass capacity, duress, and undue

14
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a
(1981).
15
The U.C.C. governs the sale of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-102. The Second Restatement represents a
summary of the common law rules generally applied by United States courts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS intro.
16
See U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178.
17
See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
18
Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119–20 (Pa. 2007) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
19
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750)
28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100; 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155).
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influence. And, to the extent courts intervene on the basis of outcomes, the
substantive element of unconscionability would apply.
In short,
unconscionability has the potential to replace all of the traditional methods
of assessing consent. What this means is that a modern assessment of
capacity, duress, and undue influence is incomplete without some attention
to unconscionability. One of the findings of this Article is that
unconscionability may be gradually eliminating the need for application of
the older doctrines.
III. THE QUESTION THROUGH AN ECONOMIC LENS AND THE
HYPOTHESIS TESTED
It may be useful to think about the question raised here in the context of
an everyday contract. Suppose Tom is willing to sell his car but for no less
than $5,000. Jane is willing to buy it but will pay no more than $7,000.
Economists would say a contract curve exists between $5,000 and $7,000.20
To a contracts professor there is a $2,000 benefit of the bargain. At any
price between $5,000 and $7,000, both parties will be better off. A
necessary part of making this contract is to strike a bargain about how to
divide the $2,000.21 It is as though the parties, having $2,000 in front of
them, must agree on how to split the $2,000 before the exchange can be
“approved.” One’s curiosity is piqued if Jane ends up paying very close to
$7,000 or Tom takes an amount a few pennies more than $5,000. Some of
the reasons for this may be entirely legitimate. Others may not be. For
example, Jane may be quite wealthy, averse to shopping or haggling, or
drawn to something special about this particular car.
On the other hand, Tom may say: “Pay $7,000, or I will tell your
employer that you have been stealing.” Here Jane may pay $7,000, or even
more, and a red flag is raised. Why would Jane pay this amount if she has
any leverage at all or unless she is buying something other than the car? In
this case, she would be buying the car and Tom’s silence. In short,
ultimately what is at issue is why one party would agree to an exchange that
results in a very small share of the benefit of the bargain, or that even leaves
him or her worse off.22 When the Janes of the world do end up with very
little of the benefit of the bargain or are actually worse off, the outcomes do
not conform to what one would expect from a fully functioning, rational,

20

See Harrison, supra note 5, at 473–74.
See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 243–45.
22
See Harrison, supra note 5, at 449 (discussing the possibility that self-esteem and relative
deprivation play a role in cases of unequal outcomes).
21
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and self-interested adult. Issues of capacity, duress, and undue influence
immediately come to mind.
These ideas lead to the following hypothesis: In recent reported cases,
courts are more likely to find a lack of capacity, the presence of duress, or
an exertion of undue influence when an exchange seems excessively to
favor one party over another or over a third party.23 It is important to note
that this hypothesis also stands for the proposition that courts are unlikely to
find a defect in consent when there appears to be no unfairness in the
exchange. I have attempted to apply a very informal methodology in which
I examine cases decided in the period from 2002 to mid-2013. I selected
cases in which courts cite the sections of the Second Restatement that bear
on each of these matters.24 This is a small sample, and there are certainly
cases that address these issues without including a Second Restatement
citation. Still there is no a priori reason why these cases would not be
representative of, or serve as a useful proxy for, all cases.
Nevertheless, the effort must be viewed as subjective and informal
because an objective standard for acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis
cannot be formulated. There is no way to quantify how much a court is
influenced by reservations about distributive matters or whether it is
influenced at all. In addition, how does one weigh five cases involving
small possible inequities in which a court does not intervene against one
involving an obvious inequity in which the court does intervene? Also, it is
impossible to know if the perceived inequity was necessary for the finding.
After all, assigning causation when it can only be inferred is risky. Thus,
the results of this Article, as is common in legal scholarship, are
impressions more than anything else, and the discussion is designed to
explain those impressions.
One limitation of the methodology cannot be avoided and should be
noted. Because all the data were drawn from reported and unreported cases,
the individuals claiming capacity, duress, or undue influence sensed
injustice and were knowledgeable enough to consult attorneys. No doubt
there are many contracts that divide the benefit of the bargain unevenly and
that involve capacity, duress, and undue influence that are never challenged.
For a variety of reasons, ranging from ignorance to financial hardship,

23
It is important to note that in many of the following cases, the party appealing to the court is not a
party to the contract. In these instances, the third party is arguing that one party to the contract was
impaired and, but for that impairment, the third party would have benefited.
24
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15, 174, 177 (1981) are those relevant sections.
There are instances beyond those cited here in which a section is cited but really has no significant role
in the decision. These cases were not examined closely.
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litigation is not pursued. Consequently, there is a socioeconomic bias
within the sample. Courts do not select the cases or the parties, and without
the “right” parties distributive goals cannot be achieved and rules about
acceptable forms of persuasion cannot be formulated.25 In short, from this
survey it is not possible to generalize about how courts would react to cases
brought by those less likely to litigate. Nor should any inferences be drawn
about the frequency of capacity limitation, duress, or undue influence.26
IV. CONSENT AND PREFERENCES
Although this effort is about “defects” in consent, it is useful to
contextualize those defects by noting other limitations on matching what
people do with what they really want. Knowing that individuals have
manifested consent is not the same as knowing what that means or how
important it is. Ideally, rational, fully-informed people consent as a way to
express their preferences when faced with a choice. If this applies across
the board, general welfare rises.27 As it turns out though, the connection
between consent and preference is fragile.28 That connection depends on a
number of assumptions, facts, and personal traits.29 Moreover, if the link
between consent and preference is sometimes weak, the moral rationale for
deference to consent also weakens.
One personal story expresses this aptly, and perhaps every reader has
experienced something similar. As a younger professor I was chatting with
an office neighbor, and the conversation turned to yearly salary increases.
He indicated that each year when he received his letter indicating what his
salary would be the next year, he always felt good about even a modest
increase. He was even foolish enough to thank the dean. In fact, you could
say that he consented to the new arrangement. For the sake of this story,
assume that the increases were 3% per year. After several years, and
completely by accident, he discovered that his neighbor at the time was

25

See Harrison, supra note 5, at 464–65. This is, however, likely to be an inefficient and
incomplete response. More promising, perhaps, are statutory responses.
26
Except, perhaps, to infer that these influences are far more frequent than the small number of
cases here suggest.
27
This provides an economic and moral basis for contracts—Pareto efficiency. If both parties are
better off and no one is worse off, overall utility is increased and there should be little in the way of
moral objection.
28
See THOMAS F. COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: POSITIVE, NORMATIVE
AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 133–41 (3d ed. 2013); Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of
Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241, 242 (1973).
29
See Sen, supra note 28, at 241.
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receiving 4% increases. He was angry and, although hardly in a position to
resign, his consent, in terms of feeling he had made a choice that he was
pleased with, was gone. When he complained to the dean, the dean was
quick to point out that he had always been grateful for the raise.
His consent was contingent on not knowing a tiny piece of information.
In fact, all our decisions and our consents are based on what we know, and
whether we like it or not, what we do not know. Consent may reflect a
preference, but often that preference is a very “thin” one, resting on
incomplete or even inaccurate information.30
Consider another problem, which is closer to the focus of the Article. If
you have young children, you know that supermarkets sometimes put candy
at the child’s eye level in the checkout lanes. The child may pick up the
candy and insist on having it bought. The parent, wanting to avoid a scene,
may buy it. Has the parent consented to purchase the candy? Evidently so.
On the other hand, does that reveal the preference of the parent? Perhaps
not if the preference of the parent is not to have been forced to make the
choice in the first place. In fact, this may simply be a case of extortion. Of
course, the parent may not give in to the child. One could say he or she was
not coerced; does it make a difference? The preference was not to have had
to make the choice.
As these examples suggest, a number of factors create a wedge between
preferences and consent. Perhaps an ideal system of contract law would
respond to all of these factors. Reliance on doctrines ranging from capacity
to undue influence can close the gap between choices and preferences.
Nevertheless, reconciling consent with actual preferences remains a puzzle.
V. THE BLACK LETTER LAW
Defects in consent may arise from characteristics of the party seeking to
avoid a contract or the actions of those with whom he or she contracts. In
the first category are issues that relate to capacity. Section 15 of the Second
Restatement reads as follows:
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a
transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and

30
See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations
of Legal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4 (1994).
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consequences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the
transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.[31]
(2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without
knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance under
Subsection (1) terminates to the extent that the contract has been so
performed in whole or in part or the circumstances have so changed that
avoidance would be unjust. In such a case a court may grant relief as
justice requires.32

Section 15 employs the common standard of “reasonableness” and
clearly opens the door to a battle of the experts with respect to capacity. It
also identifies two types of capacity—cognitive and volitional.33
Interestingly, it includes some of its own guidelines with respect to when
the fairness of the bargain is relevant. For example, volitional impairment
allows avoidance by one party only if the other party had reason to know of
the impairment.34 Thus, even the person who is not fully able to express his
or her preferences accurately by manifesting consent will not be able to
avoid the contract in the absence of advantage-taking. In addition, there is
protection “as justice requires” for parties who have partially performed.35
Two sections of the Second Restatement focus on the influence that
contracting parties have on each other. The first, section 175, concerns
duress: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the
contract is voidable by the victim.”36 The Second Restatement also lists
instances when a threat is improper.37 These examples are of limited use

31

This is called the volitional test and is a newer standard than the cognitive test found in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a) (1981). Not all states have adopted the volitional
test. It is possible for the outcome of an assessment of capacity to depend on the standard adopted in a
particular state. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Davis, 89 P.3d 1206, 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam).
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15.
33
See id.
34
Id. § 15(1)(b). Avoidance is also permitted in situations of impairment due to the use of alcohol
or other drugs. Id. § 17.
35
Id. § 15(2).
36
Id. § 175(1). Under the other subsection, a threat by a third party may also make the contract
voidable, but not if the contracting party acts in good faith and without reason to know of the threat and
gives value or materially changes position. Id. § 175(2).
37
The Second Restatement provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A threat is improper if
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since they are inclusive enough to allow a finding of impropriety whenever
a court deems it appropriate.38 Interestingly, the fairness of the exchange
can be a consideration when deciding if a threat is improper and, thus,
whether duress was applied.39
In the case of undue influence, the Second Restatement rule is: “Undue
influence is unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the
person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between
them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner
inconsistent with his welfare.”40 Further assistance in understanding how
the concept is applied is found in the Second Restatement’s commentary,
which indicates that factors to be considered include “the unfairness of the
resulting bargain, the unavailability of independent advice, and the
susceptibility of the person persuaded.”41
Together these rules describe circumstances under which consent is the
product of illegitimate factors. Central to all of the rules is the notion of
compulsion—whether from within or without. The rules also have few

(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a tort if
it resulted in obtaining property,
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with
the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the
party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is significantly
increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.
Id. § 176.
38
See id.
39
Id. § 176(2).
40
Id. § 177(1). The relationship leading to undue influence is often termed “confidential.” See,
e.g., Russo v. Miller, 559 A.2d 354, 357–58 (Me. 1989). When the undue influence is applied by a third
party, it is more difficult to avoid the contract: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by one
who is not a party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to the
transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the undue influence either gives value or relies
materially on the transaction.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(3).
41
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b. The comment goes on to say that these
factors alone are not controlling. Id.
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limiting principles. An improper threat is what a court says it is. Capacity
issues lead to a battle of the experts, since there is no objective notion of
having or lacking capacity other than, perhaps, a lack of consciousness.
Similarly, no one can identify the point along the influence continuum at
which influence becomes “undue.” Most interestingly, all of the Second
Restatement sections invite courts to examine the fairness of the exchange
in determining whether to apply the doctrines of capacity, duress, or undue
influence.42
VI. THREE DOCTRINES OF LEGITIMACY
A. Capacity
Using the search term described above,43 I found twenty recent cases
discussing capacity in the context of contractual avoidance.44 In terms of
setting rules for influence or persuasion, the rules with respect to capacity
work in a fashion similar to strict liability. No means of persuasion are safe
or acceptable when the opposite party lacks capacity.45 The Second
Restatement captures the breadth of authority courts have to determine
capacity or allow it to be determined: “Proof of irrational or unintelligent
behavior is essential; almost any conduct of the person may be relevant, as
may lay and expert opinions and prior and subsequent adjudications of
incompetency.”46
Perhaps the best known American case in which a judicial perception of
unfairness influenced a finding that a contracting party lacked capacity is
Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board.47 Admittedly it also shaped my
expectations and, consequently, rejection or acceptance of the hypothesis
identified earlier. Ortelere, a retired teacher, elected to accept her pension
pay-out in the form of a higher periodic payment for the rest of her life as

42

See id. §§ 12, 176–177.
WESTLAW CLASSIC, http://web2.westlaw.com (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s15 & capacity
& after 2002”) (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
44
See, e.g., Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003); Schmidt v. Shah, 696 F. Supp. 2d 44
(D.D.C. 2010); Biggs v. Eaglewood Mortg., LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d per curiam,
353 F. App’x 864 (4th Cir. 2009); Steward Mach. Co. v. White Oak Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.
Conn. 2006); Belcher v. Queen, 39 So. 3d 1023 (Ala. 2009); Indus. Commercial Elec., Inc. v. McLees,
101 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2004); In re Estate of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153 (Me. 2003); Spicer v. Balt. Gas &
Elec. Co., 831 A.2d 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296 (Mass.
2012); In re Marriage of Davis, 89 P.3d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam).
45
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. d.
46
Id. § 15 cmt. c.
47
Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969).
43
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opposed to a smaller payment that would extend through the life of herself
or her husband, whichever would be longer.48 Shortly after the election, she
died, meaning that payments ceased.49 A few hundred dollars had been
paid from a retirement reserve in excess of $60,000.50 Her husband asked
to have her election avoided based on her incapacity due to volitional
impairment, and the court agreed.51
It is difficult not to see the holding as resting primarily on the fact that
many years of expected payments were, in effect, forfeited. Ortelere made
what amounted to a bet and lost. She appeared to have understood what she
was doing, and the family finances at the time made the election seem
reasonable.52 Faced with the fact that she had asked questions that indicated
a high degree of rationality, the court opted to use volitional impairment as
the basis for its judgment.53 The precise basis for a finding that she lacked
control of her actions is not clear but, again, the decision itself seems to be
governed by the loss of expected pension payments. Volitional impairment
is particularly well suited to reactions based on perceived unfairness. In
fact, according to another court, the key to volitional impairment is whether
“the transaction in its result is one which a reasonably competent person
might have made.”54 In effect, competency can be inferred from the
substance of the exchange. This policy is noted more recently in a
Delaware case in which the court explained that “in certain circumstances,
courts have considered the adequacy of consideration as an indicium of
mental incompetence.”55
If this interpretation of Ortelere is correct,56 then the question for the
purposes of this analysis is whether Ortelere is representative of a more
general policy of allowing avoidance based on perhaps weak evidence of a
true lack of capacity when a party has simply made an unfortunate choice
that means suffering by way of forfeiture.57 A survey of recent cases

48

Id. at 461.
Id.
50
Id. at 463.
51
Id. at 466.
52
Id. at 466–68 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
53
Id. at 464–66 (majority opinion).
54
Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 303 (Mass. 2012) (quoting Krasner v. Berk, 319 N.E.2d
897, 900 (Mass. 1974)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
55
Bettis v. Premier Pool & Prop. Mgmt., LLC, No. 6858-VCN, 2012 WL 4662225, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 26, 2012) (footnote omitted).
56
Although a casebook favorite, Ortelere has been rarely cited outside of New York.
57
Ortelere is distinguished in Marston v. United States, Civil Action No. 10-10437-GAO, 2012 WL
4529940 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2012), in which a party attempted to avoid a settlement agreement. The
court noted the reasonableness of the settlement, given that there may have been no recovery at all. Id.
49
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indicated that the policy of considering the fairness of the outcome is more
pronounced in Ortelere than it is generally.58 This is very likely explained
in part by the facts of Ortelere. There the advantaged party was a state
agency, and the disadvantaged party was supporting a spouse.59 The
possibility that courts are more likely to find a defect in consent when an
agency or organization is involved is generally supported by other recent
cases.60
For example, far more common than the Ortelere fact pattern are
disputes between family members concerning the actions by a mother or
father.61 This is not surprising because, all other factors being equal, the
elderly are most prone to capacity issues. Interestingly, in these recent
cases, courts seem less likely to find a defect in consent.62 For example, in
Dubree v. Blackwell, the executor and beneficiary of a will (and nephew of
the testator) challenged the contractual capacity of the decedent when it
was discovered that she had deeded her house and bank accounts to her
brother-in-law prior to her death.63 Expert witnesses testified on both sides
of the case, and the jury found against the executor with respect to the
question of capacity.64 On appeal, the court affirmed, noting that the
beneficiary of the contracts had been a lifelong friend and had cared for the
decedent for nearly ten years.65
Cases like Dubree illustrate the difficulties of interpretation. For
example, perhaps the case is as simple as it appears on its face—the
deceased did not lack capacity. On the other hand, it may represent a battle
between private parties for whom the funds involved would have been a
windfall. Unlike Ortelere, there would be no obvious reason for favoring
one, as a distributive matter, over the other.66 Finally, and in a manner that
at *24.
58
See Marston, 2012 WL 4529940, at *24 (remarking on the reasonableness of the settlement);
Bettis, 2012 WL 4662225, at *3 (noting that some courts do consider the fairness of consideration when
determining mental capacity); Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 306 (finding no evidence that the settlement was
unreasonable or that a competent person would not have agreed to it). Part of the danger is that opinions
may reflect only the conclusion that a party has made sufficient allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment. This is an imperfect indication of the actual policy.
59
Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 461–62 (N.Y. 1969).
60
See, e.g., Duke v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. W2010-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2011
WL 864321, at *8–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011) (holding that an arbitration agreement with a
nursing home was invalid due to patient’s incapacity when signing power of attorney).
61
See, e.g., Dickson v. Long, No. M2008-00279-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 961784, at *2–7 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2009) (involving a step-mother’s capacity to sign power of attorney agreement and
convey land to step-daughter instead of step-son).
62
See cases cited supra note 44. This is not to say there has been a change.
63
Dubree v. Blackwell, 67 S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex. App. 2001).
64
Id. at 288–90.
65
Id. at 288.
66
Compare Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969), with Dubree, 67 S.W.3d
286.
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would be consistent with the hypothesis posed here, perhaps the court (and
the jury at the trial court) felt that injustice would result if the caretaker for
ten years were deprived of the payment that he received.67 Again, it is
dangerous to infer causation, but the pattern suggests that without
unfairness, the doctrine of lack of capacity is less likely to be successful.
Family disputes were also involved in Duke v. Kindred Healthcare
Operating, Inc.,68 but here the presence of an organization may have played
a role, as it did in Ortelere. In this case, a person with Alzheimer’s disease
was admitted to a long-term care facility.69 The admissions documents
were signed by the patient’s sister, who had power of attorney.70 These
documents provided for arbitration.71 When a lawsuit was filed by the
patient’s wife claiming neglect and abuse by the healthcare facility, the
defendants moved to compel arbitration.72 The wife objected claiming that
the patient lacked capacity when he signed the documents granting his sister
power of attorney.73 Here the court, without discussing the financial
consequences of the decision, found that there was overwhelming evidence
of a lack of capacity.74 Were the consequences of the actual contract
relevant? Although there was no direct discussion of it, it is possible that
the opinion was influenced by a generally negative view of compulsory
arbitration.75 From that perspective, the case has an Ortelere-like quality, in
that the disadvantaged party was pitted against an organization without any
obvious fairness-based arguments to support its position. The decision can
be viewed as supporting the hypothesis that other factors were likely at
work.
Dickson v. Long lends some support to the idea that the individualversus-organization context is more likely to result in a finding of a lack of
capacity.76 The case involved the grant of power of attorney to, and the

67

The court also upheld the decision that there was no undue influence. Dubree, 67 S.W.3d at 291.
Duke v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. W2010-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 864321
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011).
69
Id. at *1.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at *8–10.
75
See infra Part VII.A.
76
Dickson v. Long, No. M2008-00279-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 961784 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8,
2009); see also Carpenter v. Sims, No. E2007-0622-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4963008 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 7, 2007) (finding that the deceased seller of a condominium was mentally competent and the sale
should not be set aside as requested by the beneficiaries of the will); Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the decedent was mentally competent
68
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subsequent sale of property by, a stepson, which the natural son
unsuccessfully challenged.77 Under the terms of the appointment by the
deceased, the sale could only be made to a daughter.78 There was
conflicting evidence with respect to the mother’s capacity, but the court
ruled that she was competent.79 At the risk of reading too much into the
opinion, the court may have been influenced by the fact that the dispute was
ultimately between two siblings, and that the signing took place in the
presence of a notary, which the court viewed as offering some protection
for the mother.80 Again, although it may be best to take these decisions at
face value, it is noteworthy that the dispute was ultimately one in which
there was no clear inequity affecting the party whom allegedly lacked
capacity.81
As one would expect, when indications of a lack of capacity are
extreme, it does not matter whether a relatively impersonal organization is
involved. A case in point is In re Estate of Marquis.82 Prior to her death,
the decedent had changed the beneficiary of various annuities from her
estate to a grandnephew in recognition of his regular visits and willingness
to run errands.83 Before the change, the proceeds would have gone to
twelve family members as well as two charities.84
Her personal
representative claimed that she lacked capacity to change the annuity
beneficiary, even though the change came after an extended discussion with
a financial advisor who testified that she was “well spoken.”85 The court
relied on substantial testimony that the decedent had demonstrated a
decreasing sense of awareness and found a lack of capacity.86 Bills were
left unpaid, and the decedent had delusions that her dog had nursed her to
health and that her television was talking to her.87 This may be a simple
instance of a court applying a standard of competence when there was no
inequity to influence it either way. The only thing that casts some doubt on
the face value interpretation is that courts have consistently noted that one
can have cognition problems as long as those problems are not in effect

when she changed her life insurance beneficiary from her estranged husband to her brother).
77
Dickson, 2009 WL 961784, at *1.
78
Id.
79
Id. at *4, *7.
80
Id. at *7.
81
See id. at *11–12.
82
In re Estate of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153 (Me. 2003).
83
Id. at 1155. A change in beneficiary is, in effect, a change in a contract and requires contractual
capacity. Id. at 1156.
84
Id. at 1155.
85
Id. at 1155–56.
86
Id. at 1158.
87
Id. Evidently these beliefs were found to be untrue.
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when the contract sought to be avoided was made.88 In this case, the
evidence available suggested that she did understand the contract
modification that she was making.89 In fact, it is hard to square the notion
of a “lack of capacity” with a decision to change the beneficiary to a
specific family member.90
A relatively rare case in which family members are not contesting the
contracts made by a deceased relative is Knoll v. Merrill Corp., in which an
employee, Knoll, made a claim of wrongful discharge.91 Later, he signed a
release, and then claimed that he lacked capacity to sign the release.92 In
actuality, the discharged employee had been depressed and confided in his
employer.93 Eventually, the discharge stemmed from this condition or
efforts to treat it.94 Relying on Ortelere, the court held that there was a
question of fact with respect to whether the plaintiff’s condition led to
volitional impairment.95 The court noted that, like Ortelere, the mere fact
that Knoll understood enough to ask questions did not settle the question of
capacity.96 It is worth noting that here again the individual-versusorganization pattern is present.
In contrast to Ortelere and Knoll, two recent cases have rejected claims
of incapacity in the context of settlements following mediation.97 In neither
case did the settlement appear to result in a substantially one-sided
outcome, and the parties were represented by counsel.98 This is consistent
with the policy of favoring settlement of disputes.99 In addition, the
outcomes may be understood by noting that, whether or not the parties had
capacity as a medical matter, both were supervised or cared for in a way
that maintained procedural fairness.100
A few tentative conclusions follow from these cases and others that
were examined in the time period. Whether viewed as evidence of a lack of
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See id.
See id. at 1155–56.
90
Id. at 1156.
91
Knoll v. Merrill Corp., No. 02 Civ.566 CSH, 2003 WL 21556942, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2003),
vacated pursuant to settlement (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2005).
92
Id. at *9.
93
Id. at *2.
94
Id.
95
Id. at *11–12.
96
Id. at *11.
97
Marston v. United States, Civil Action No. 10-10437-GAO, 2012 WL 4529940, at *24 (D. Mass.
Sept. 30, 2012); Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 297 (Mass. 2012).
98
See Marston, 2012 WL 4529940, at *12–14; Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 300–01.
99
See, e.g., Williams v. First Nat. Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910).
100
See generally Marston, 2012 WL 4529940; Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d 296.
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capacity or not, some cases suggest that the balance of the exchange does
influence the decision to apply the doctrine.101 On the other hand, two
factors that cut in different directions seem also to influence the outcome of
the cases. When the advantaged party is an organization, as opposed to a
private party, courts seem more willing to find that the contracting party
lacked capacity.102 The underlying notion is that the consequences are less
onerous to the losing party when that party is an organization. On the other
hand, relatives or other individuals who feel disadvantaged by contractual
decisions seem to have less luck with their claim that the contracting party
lacked capacity.103 This makes sense because, in most instances, the
relatives are squabbling over a windfall, and it would be difficult to claim
that one side or the other is more deserving or has suffered an injustice by
virtue of the distribution made. In fact, the party who supposedly lacked
capacity has no interest at this point, and the relatives are simply arguing
over the “spoils.”
B. Duress
Using the search term for duress104 yielded eleven cases.105 Section 175
of the Second Restatement recognizes that unfairness in the outcome of the
bargain is part of the duress analysis.106 This reflects the generally held
view. For example, in 1947, John P. Dawson wrote: “For it is through
duress and related ideas that private law has dealt most directly with
problems raised by inequality in bargaining power.”107 And, in 1953, an
Idaho court noted that to be “voidable because of duress, an agreement must
not only be obtained by means of the pressure brought to bear, but the

101

See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76–81, 91–96 and accompanying text.
103
See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.
104
WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s174 & duress & after
2002”).
105
See, e.g., D’Antuono v. Serv. Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D. Conn. 2011); Wright v.
Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d per curiam, No. 07-5328, 2008
WL 4068606 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2008); Sw. La. Healthcare Sys. v. MBIA Ins. Corp., No. 05-1299,
2007 WL 979933 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2007); Weinberg v. Interep Corp., Civil No. 05-5458(JBS), 2006
WL 1096908 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2006); Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
Schultz v. Schultz, 867 So. 2d 745 (La. Ct. App. 2003); In re Estate of Rosasco, 927 N.Y.S.2d 819, 2011
WL 1467632 (Sur. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision); Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185
S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2005). Because the sample is small, an additional sample from 1996 to 2001 was
examined. WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s174 & duress & after
1995 & before 2002”). That sample did not suggest that the cases reported here were atypical.
106
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
107
John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 253 (1947).
102
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agreement itself must be unjust, unconscionable, or illegal.”108 Given that
there appears to be a long-running consensus that duress is a response to
unequal bargaining power resulting in unfair outcomes, it is interesting to
examine cases for the purpose of determining if this “ideal” is the reality.109
What a survey of recent cases suggests is that courts are far from anxious to
find duress. If anything, the opposite is true: Courts seem more inclined to
disassemble duress claims and find little or no basis for them.
As these cases are examined, a cautionary note bears repeating.110 In
these reported and unreported cases, few if any of the parties claiming to
have experienced duress appear to be from lower and less educated
socioeconomic classes. Ironically, parties who may have the best chance to
present a compelling case are likely to be the same people who either do not
feel that they were under duress, may not have aspirations to be treated
more fairly, or are not even aware that some form of legal recourse may
exist.111
Attempting to discern any concern for equity by a court under the
rubric of duress is difficult, in part because duress requires the party
attempting to avoid the contract to clear a number of hurdles. Not only
must the threat be improper, it must leave no reasonable alternative.112 The
threat must also be the cause of the consent.113 In addition, the person
claiming duress may be viewed as ratifying the agreement if he or she waits
too long before raising the issue.114 Further, if the threat comes from a third
party, duress is unavailable if the advantaged party did not know of the
threat, acted in good faith, and either gave value or relied on the consent.115
Finally, in recent cases duress is most often raised when a party to the
settlement of a legal claim later regrets the outcome and attempts to avoid
the agreement, or in the context of a divorce.116 Courts do not seem
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Newland v. Child, 254 P.2d 1066, 1072 (Idaho 1953).
No effort is made here to distinguish economic duress from other forms of duress. Both deal with
the issue of illegitimate uses of power. See generally Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of
Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171 (2013). For a discussion of the role of stress in duress cases, see
Hila Keren, Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (2013).
110
See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
111
See Harrison, supra note 5, at 469–80.
112
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
113
Id. § 175 cmt. c.
114
See, e.g., Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nev. Nat. Bank of S.F., 270 U.S. 438, 443–44 (1926) (holding
that when a contract is made under duress, it is voidable by the contracting party, and failure of that
party to disaffirm effectively waives the right to bring a duress claim).
115
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e.
116
See infra notes 117–22, 125–33, 151–58, 174–75 and accompanying text.
109

212

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:193

especially receptive to duress claims in these circumstances.117
Considerations of equity may conflict with the goal of encouraging
settlement.
A representative example is Biliouris v. Biliouris, in which a divorced
wife attempted to show that she was under duress when signing an
antenuptial agreement.118 At the time of the marriage, she was thirty-five
years old, had three children, and was pregnant with the child of the future
spouse.119 The agreement was presented to her one week before the
marriage.120 She signed against the advice of counsel and was crying at the
time.121 Evidently, the threat was that the husband would not marry her
unless the agreement was signed.122 Under the terms of the agreement,
there was to be no alimony, and each party would keep the property that
they brought to the marriage.123 In finding no duress, the court noted that
the agreement was fair at the time it was made, that the wife did have time
to consider it, and that
[t]he wife was an educated professional who had a demonstrated earning
capacity at the time she executed the agreement in 1992. Although the
parties agreed that the wife would leave her job in order to be a “stay-athome” mother, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the wife
would be incapable of working and earning income to support herself in
the event of a divorce in the future.124

It is also important to note that the wife retained $100,000 of her own
assets, received child support payments, and held 80% of the equity in the
home.125
The terms of the contract and the background of another disappointed
settling party were evidently relevant in Gascho v. Scheurer Hospital.126
Mrs. Gascho was an employee of a hospital at which her husband also
worked.127 He was having an affair with a supervisor at the hospital.128

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

See infra notes 123–24, 134–39, 159–60, 176–81 and accompanying text.
Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 689 n.1.
Id. at 689 & n.2.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 691–92, 696.
Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J.).
Id. at 979.
Id. at 980.
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This eventually led to an altercation between Mrs. Gascho and the
supervisor, and the offer of a severance package for Mrs. Gascho.129 Under
the terms of the agreement, Mrs. Gascho agreed to resign and release any
claims, including those under Title VII.130 She was given twenty-one days
to consider the proposal.131 During that period, her husband evidently made
a number of threats to “destroy [her] life” if she did not sign.132 She
eventually signed in what was characterized as a “civil” meeting.133 A year
later, she sought to avoid the agreement.134
In finding a lack of duress, the court noted that Mrs. Gascho had been a
nurse for thirty years and, at times, had managerial duties.135 More
importantly, the court found no improper threat.136 The agreement was with
the hospital, which had not threatened her and which seemed to have acted
in good faith.137 The court viewed her claim to be that she had no choice
because she did not want to risk turning down the offer, and therefore
losing the benefits if her potential lawsuit was unsuccessful.138 According
to the court, “that is not how it works.”139 The risk of economic hardship is,
according to the court, part of the bargaining process.140
Both Gascho and Biliouris suggest that status and education are
relevant.141 Another example is Samuelson v. Covenant HealthCare
System.142 There, a registered nurse was fifty-seven years old at the time
that she stopped working and began collecting short-term disability
benefits.143 She had worked for the same employer for twenty-five years.144

129

Id. at 980–81.
Id. The Title VII claim related to sexual harassment, but the report of the case does not elaborate
on the basis for that claim.
131
Id. at 982.
132
Id. at 980 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
Id. at 981 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 983.
137
Id. at 983–85. She claimed that the improper threat existed by virtue of the fiduciary relationship
she had with her husband, but the court noted that the husband was not a party to the case. Id. at 984.
The threat of a third party may be the basis for avoidance, but there are exceptions. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e (1981); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Claywell Elec.
Co., No. HHD-CV-05-4015464, 2008 WL 2039145, at *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2008).
138
Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 983.
139
Id.
140
Id.
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See generally id.; Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
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Samuelson v. Covenant HealthCare Sys., No. 10-13422-BC, 2011 WL 5143156 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
31, 2011).
143
Id. at *2.
144
Id. at *1.
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When the disability benefits ran out, she began collecting retirement
payments.145 By retiring when she did, she was entitled to $36,000 for
healthcare expenses.146 Later, she was informed that because of her early
retirement, some of her benefits offset each other.147 She objected, claiming
that she elected to retire when she did due to duress resulting from the fact
that had she not retired, she would have lost the $36,000 payment.148 The
court noted that she was simply forced to make a choice; nothing deprived
her of her free will.149 The court also devoted much of the opinion to
describing why her decision was economically beneficial.150
The
151
implication is that the fairness of the exchange was influential.
As Biliouris suggests, marital issues often give rise to claims of
duress.152 In Hardey v. Metzger, the husband sought to avoid a property
settlement agreement with his wife, arguing that it was the result of
extortion.153 The source of the dispute was a $200,000 loan that the
husband had obtained by using as collateral the property owned solely by
the wife.154 She was unaware of this, as he had forged her signature.155 The
debt became an issue in the context of their divorce.156 He promised to pay
the debt directly, and she signed papers recognizing the debt and extending
the due date.157 In the period leading up to the signing, her attorney
threatened to commence civil proceedings against the husband.158 She also
told the husband she would “send [him] to jail.”159 The court found that the
husband had not proven duress because he was unable to prove “contractual
causation”—that he signed because of the threats.160 Again, on its face, the
actual agreement appears to have been a fair one.161
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Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5, *7.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
See id. at *6–8.
See generally Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
Hardey v. Metzger, Record No. 2628-07-4, 2008 WL 3895686, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 26,

2008).
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Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *5.
See id.
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Settlements associated with employment termination or a threatened
termination also lead to claims of duress. For example, in Wright v.
Foreign Service Grievance Board, Wright was a foreign service officer who
filed a grievance in response to low performance rankings.162 When he still
had the right to appeal an adverse decision, the Service offered to employ
him until he reached the twenty-year mark and expunge his record if he
would drop all further claims.163 The extension amounted to a few months
of additional employment.164 Wright was given five days to decide.165 He
later attempted to avoid the agreement on the basis of duress.166 He
complained of the short time period for his decision and the fact that he was
threatened with immediate dismissal and a loss of retirement benefits.167
Here, the court reasoned that by working until his retirement and then
collecting retirement benefits, Wright had ratified the agreement.168 As a
general matter, waiting too long before raising a duress claim almost
certainly means that it will fail.169
A claim of duress was also rejected on the basis of the presence of a
reasonable alternative in Osborne v. Howard University Physicians, Inc.170
The case involved a tenured university physician who signed a new
employment contract that effectively reduced his earnings.171
His
employer, Howard University, explained that it was forced to alter the
payment structure for university physicians due to financial problems.172
The threat was that the employee would lose his position if he did not sign
the new contract under which he also relinquished any claims under the
original contract.173 The court listed a number of alternatives including
finding alternative employment or filing an action asking a court to enjoin
his termination.174 Here again, the sophistication of the party likely played
a role.

162

Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166–67 (D.D.C. 2007).
Id. at 168–69.
164
Id. at 166–67, 169.
165
Id. at 175 n.7.
166
Id. at 174–75.
167
Id. at 174.
168
Id. at 175; see also Schmidt v. Shah, 696 F. Supp. 2d 44, 64 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that a
government employee was barred from litigating a duress claim after accepting a settlement).
169
See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 515–16 (Mass. 2007). But see Burd v.
Antilles Yachting Servs., Inc., 57 V.I. 354, 362 (V.I. 2012) (reversing a finding of ratification on
appeal).
170
Osborne v. Howard Univ. Physicians, Inc., 904 A.2d 335, 341–42 (D.C. 2006).
171
Id. at 336–38.
172
Id. at 337.
173
Id. at 337–38.
174
Id. at 341–42.
163
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Another instance of “settlement regret” is Nathan v. Calco Duct & Vent
Cleaning.175 There, a party settled a tort claim for $250,000.176 She then
alleged that her agreement was the result of duress applied by her
attorney.177 Two stumbling blocks were evident here. First, the threat was
from a third party to the contract.178 As already indicated, this makes the
claim of duress significantly harder to successfully employ.179 She testified
that she agreed because she was concerned about the expenses of litigation
and the possibility that her attorney would withdraw.180 She also consulted
other attorneys.181 The court noted that the party with whom she settled did
not know of any possible duress and had relied on her agreement to
settle.182 Second, the court found that she had effectively ratified the
agreement by waiting five weeks to raise her objections.183
One recent case in the sample that deviates from this trend of rejecting
duress claims is Dorale v. Dorale.184 There, a former wife agreed to sell an
interest in property she had received under the divorce agreement back to
her ex-husband.185 The court found there was duress by virtue of her prior
domestic abuse and fear of physical harm.186 The agreement was reached
after a contentious, four hour meeting in which a third party also urged her
to agree.187 Although not raised in the case, the fact pattern may have been
better suited for the label of undue influence.188 In any event, it appears that
the court was influenced by the fact that the selling price was about $50,000
less than the appraised value of the property.189 Dorale is not technically a
settlement case, and that may explain the court’s greater openness to a
duress claim. Interestingly, unlike the prior cases, there was no mention of
the former wife’s educational background or experience level.190

175
Nathan v. Calco Duct & Vent Cleaning, No. X09CV065005942, 2009 WL 3416440 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2009).
176
Id. at *1.
177
Id.
178
Id. at *2–3.
179
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e (1981).
180
Nathan, 2009 WL 3416440, at *4.
181
Id.
182
Id. at *3.
183
Id. at *4.
184
Dorale v. Dorale, 771 N.W.2d 651, 2009 WL 1211969 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table
decision).
185
Id. at *1.
186
Id. at *3–4.
187
Id.
188
See infra Part VI.C.
189
Dorale, 2009 WL 1211969, at *3.
190
See generally id.
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Perhaps indicative of a recent trend to reject claims of duress are two
prison cases. In Smith v. Cain, a prisoner claimed that her constitutional
rights were infringed by the prison.191 She filed a civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but eventually entered into a settlement agreement.192
Six months later she sought to disavow the settlement and claimed that she
was under duress because the prison warden threatened to have her killed if
she did not sign.193 The court denied the plaintiff’s request to reinstate the
lawsuit on the basis of duress.194 The court found the claim of a physical
threat not credible and also noted that the prisoner had enjoyed the benefits
of the settlement for six months before complaining.195 Similarly, in Reed
v. Gallegos, a prisoner who had been abused by guards contracted to
relinquish his civil rights claims in exchange for a promise to be
transferred.196 His request to avoid the contract was denied since the abuse
was not designed to encourage him to sign the contract.197 Instead, the
guards administering the abuse evidently had other motives.198
If the cases in this survey are representative, a hypothesis that courts in
the United States are quick to use the concept of duress to alter substantive
outcomes would have to be rejected. It bears noting, however, that the
parties involved in the cases studied were generally not ignorant or
deprived, nor did the benefit of the bargain obviously favor one party at the
expense of the other. As already suggested, bringing a case based on duress
requires at least some level of sophistication. Ironically, perhaps, the more
sophisticated the party, the less likely the claim will be successful.199 The
outcomes of these cases are not inconsistent with a tendency to respond to
unfairness when appropriate. But, then again, courts have no control over
which parties appeal for their assistance. In fact, for the disadvantaged in
the United States, problems in the bargaining process that are similar to
duress are most likely addressed by statutory law or fall under the doctrine
of unconscionability.200

191
Smith v. Cain, Civil Action No. 09-0322-JJB-DLD, 2012 WL 4051855, at *2–3 (M.D. La. Aug.
22, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 4051947 (M.D. La. Sept. 13, 2012).
192
Id. at *1.
193
Id. at *2.
194
Id. at *10.
195
Id.
196
Reed v. Gallegos, C.A. No. C-07-190, 2008 WL 2714082, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2008).
197
Id. at *5.
198
Id. at *3.
199
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. c (1981).
200
See infra Part VII.
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C. Undue Influence
The search term used here for “undue influence”201 produced twentytwo cases.202 Not all of the cases involve fact patterns that would make it
possible for a court to apply a corrective touch based on unfairness. For
example, in some instances, the parties appear to be distributing what would
be a windfall to either one.203 In other instances, although perhaps not a
windfall, it would be difficult to clearly identify the injustice.204 Finally, in
some instances, “undue influence” is invoked in the context of facts that are
not remotely close to those described in the Second Restatement. For
example, whatever the vices of predatory lending, a person applying for
such a loan is not likely to be under the undue influence of the lender.205
A casebook favorite that illustrates the concept and fits nicely into the
Second Restatement guidelines is Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District.206
Odorizzi was a school teacher who resigned his position after he was
arrested on criminal charges of homosexual activity.207 He later attempted
to avoid the contract on the basis of undue influence.208 The contract was
signed after a considerable time without sleep, in the evening, in his home,
and in the presence of his superiors who were threatening him with broader

201
WESTLAW CLASSIC, supra note 43 (search “restatement /3 contracts /3 s177 & ‘undue influence’
& after 2002”).
202
See, e.g., Commercial Recycling Ctr., Ltd. v. Hobbs Indus., Inc., 228 P.3d 93 (Alaska 2010);
Elias Real Estate, LLC v. Tseng, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360 (Ct. App. 2007); Moore v. Woman to Woman
Obstetrics & Gynecology, L.L.C., 3 A.3d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); Black v. Powers, 628
S.E.2d 546 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); In re Estate of Jones, 287 P.3d 610 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); Comeau v.
Nash, 233 P.3d 572 (Wyo. 2010).
203
I have not, for example, pursued the line of cases in which a transfer-on-death agreement or the
contents of a will are challenged based on the assertion that the beneficiaries unduly influenced the
testator, either in preparing a will or by virtue of a contract prior to death. In these instances, the
equities between the parties over the “spoils” are difficult to identify. See, e.g., Comeau, 233 P.3d. at
572.
204
For example, the search located Barba v. Seung Heun Lee, No. CV 09-1115-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL
8747368 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009), but there the record available was not sufficient to determine facts
with respect to undue influence. The case, however, does have interesting implications, as the parties
claiming to have been unduly influenced voluntarily attended a Yoga school in which they underwent
severe deprivation and were told to donate all their belongings to the organization. Id. at *1–2.
205
See Storie v. Household Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-40268-FDS, 2005 WL 3728718, at *6 (D.
Mass. Sept. 22, 2005); see also Gengaro v. Local 3144, No. CV54009789S, 2008 WL 2068254, at *2–5
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Gengaro v. City of New Haven, 984 A.2d 1133 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2009). Similarly, a partner at Ernst & Young is unlikely to portray herself as an
“unsophisticated school girl.” United States v. Fletcher, No. 06 C 6056, 2008 WL 162758, at *11 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.).
206
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
207
Id. at 537.
208
Id.
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exposure.209 The court found that there was enough evidence of undue
influence to merit a trial on the issue.210 As a general matter, undue
influence involves the domination of one person that results in a choice that
the subordinate party would not otherwise make.211 With its somewhat
more flexible definition than duress and capacity, the potential use of the
doctrine to extract individuals from bargains that seem unfair is obvious.212
Since undue influence typically applies, if at all, when the
disadvantaged party is in a weakened state, it might be expected that it
would be generally found alongside a claim based on lack of capacity.213
This is not the case. Similarly, since capacity issues are often raised by
third parties who stand to benefit from voiding the contract, corresponding
claims for undue influence might be expected. In practice, though, it
appears that parties to a contract are more likely to invoke undue influence
and third parties more likely to rely on capacity. The reason for this
difference is not clear. One possibility is that an assertion by a party that he
or she lacked capacity might be stigmatizing and might require possibly
embarrassing or intrusive medical testimony. Further, undue influence is
temporary and situational.214 It is possible that it is a more comfortable

209
Id. at 537–38. The court found that Odorizzi had stated a cause of action. Id. at 543. It provided
the following list of undue influence indicators:

(1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2) consummation of
the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent demand that the business be finished at
once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple
persuaders by the dominant side against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party
advisers to the servient party, (7) statements that there is no time to consult financial
advisers or attorneys. If a number of these elements are simultaneously present, the
persuasion may be characterized as excessive.
Id. at 541.
210
Id. at 543.
211
Id. at 540–41.
212
As an aside, Odorizzi itself has rarely been cited outside of California.
213
The close relationship of undue influence to unconscionability is suggested by the Second
Restatement:
[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception
or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real
alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
214
See Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
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admission to make. A third party might, on the other hand, feel more free
to make assertions about someone else’s capacity.
Before examining whether courts appear to be advancing distributive
goals, two reminders are in order. First, if courts do seem to pursue these
goals in the context of undue influence more than in claims of capacity, it
could be because, as noted above, these cases more frequently involve an
actual party to the contract in question. Second, as in duress, when the
pressure leading to the consent is not applied by a party to the contract,
avoidance is more difficult.215 The point is that if courts respond to
distributive outcomes under the rubric of undue influence, one would
expect the claim to be made by a sympathetic person who was a party to the
contract and that the pressure came from the party who was unfairly
advantaged.
This combination was not frequently found in recent cases and, for the
most part, the outcomes are quite predictable. Two cases illustrate the
importance of the source of the undue influence. In Chai v. Commissioner,
a taxpayer claimed to be unduly influenced to agree to extend the
limitations period with respect to a tax assessment.216 He had not consulted
an attorney and was advised to agree by a business associate who was also
the husband of a cousin.217 The undue influence allegedly flowed from this
relative.218 The court noted that even if the associate had the necessary
domination, there was no evidence that it was used in a way that interfered
with the judgment of the contracting party.219
A similar pattern with, perhaps, a more sympathetic party is found in
Stoudmire v. U.S. Xpress, Inc.220 Stoudmire, a truck driver, without
assistance of an attorney, settled a worker’s compensation case.221 Included
in the settlement was an agreement to release all claims that he may have
against the employer.222 In fact, at that time, he had a civil rights claim
pending and had hired counsel for that claim.223 Because he felt the release
was likely to apply to the civil rights claim, the attorney advised him,

215

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) & cmt. e.
Chai v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, 521 (T.C. 2011).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 521–22. Undue influence by someone who is not a party to the contract is less likely to
result in avoidance. See supra Part V.
220
Stoudmire v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 2:12cv1055-MHT, 2013 WL 1363484 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 3,
2013).
221
Id. at *1.
222
Id.
223
Id.
216

2015]

Defects in Consent and Dividing the Benefit of the Bargain

221

evidently quite forcefully, to settle the civil rights claim for a very small
amount.224 Stoudmire asked to have the settlement avoided on the basis of
the undue influence applied by his attorney.225 The court denied the request
noting that facing an overbearing attorney did not rise to the level of undue
influence.226 What these cases suggest, if anything, is that courts will not
“reach” to affect a different distributive outcome unless all the necessary
components of undue influence are present.
Undue influence is most successful as a method of avoiding a contract
when the parties have a confidential relationship.227 This finding shifts the
burden to the party accused of exerting undue influence to show that none
existed.228 Burden shifting has a huge substantive effect, and the decision
to make that shift may itself be a function of perceived unfairness. An
example of this is seen in Ross v. Hodge, another instance in which the
fairness of the bargain played a role in the outcome of the case.229 There, a
relatively unsophisticated business owner, Hodge, hired Bracy to assist in
applying for federal contracts.230 Hodge eventually purchased a house for
Bracy to live in.231 The owners were Hodge, Bracy, and Bracy’s girlfriend,
Ross.232 Eventually, Hodge and Bracy signed their ownership interest over
to Ross, who, through a series of transactions, sold the property and kept
the proceeds.233
Hodge complained that he was led to believe that the property was
bought for his employees generally and that Bracy and Ross were not
authorized to have their names listed as co-owners.234 The undue
influenced flowed from Ross to Hodge.235 The court was obviously swayed
by the fact that Hodge allegedly could not read,236 and ended up buying the

224

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3. Yet another case in which an attorney is accused of undue influence is Kayla P. v.
Morgan C., No. 1 CA-JV 09-0190, 2010 WL 987071 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010).
226
Stoudmire, 2013 WL 1363484, at *3.
227
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. a (1981).
228
See, e.g., Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank of N.J., 432 A.2d 890, 897–98 (N.J. 1981); Howard v.
Nasser, 613 S.E.2d 64, 68–69 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); In re Estate of Duebendorfer, 721 N.W.2d 438,
446–47 (S.D. 2006). But see Estate of Reichel, 400 A.2d 1268, 1270 (Pa. 1979) (explaining that
Pennsylvania law requires more than proof of a confidential relationship before the burden shifts).
229
Ross v. Hodge, 58 V.I. 292 (V.I. 2013).
230
Id. at 296.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 296–97.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 297–98.
235
Id. at 304.
236
This was disputed. Id. at 305.
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house but having no equity in it.237 In addition, he had become close
friends with Ross.238 The court noted that Hodge was subservient to Ross
and that a confidential relationship existed.239 At that point the burden
shifted to Ross to show there was no undue influence—a test she failed.240
The dissent correctly noted that the lower court and the majority had not
adhered to the undue influence standards.241 There was no evidence that
Hodge’s will was overcome nor of any specifics about how and when the
actual pressure was asserted.242 In effect, it appears the court, shocked by
the underhandedness of Ross, used “undue influence” as a method of
correcting an injustice.243
Similarly, in LeSure v. Andrus, a couple separated after living together
for ten years.244 During this time, the female half of the couple, Andrus,
incurred nearly all the expenses associated with the home.245 After a year
and a half, though, she made the male, LeSure, a co-owner of the
property.246 After the separation, LeSure sought to assert his half ownership
interest, and the response was that the transfer was a result of undue
influence.247 The court noted that a confidential relationship existed at the
time of the transfer and then found that LeSure had been unable to prove the
absence of undue influence.248 It is quite possible that the court was also
influenced by the fact that all payments associated with the property were
made by Andrus, that she owned the property prior to the relationship, and
that she had yearly earnings significantly below those of LeSure.249
Obviously, the existence of a familial relationship can influence the finding
of a confidential relationship, but it does not always follow.250

237

See id. at 304–05.
Id. at 298.
239
Id. at 304.
240
Id. at 304–06.
241
Id. at 312–14 (Hodge, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242
Id. at 313.
243
See id. In reality, the case seems more suited for fraud or misrepresentation since Bracy and Ross
misled Hodge about the consequences of the transactions. See id. at 313–14.
244
LeSure v. Andrus (In re Andrus), Bankruptcy No. 09-13123, Adversary No. 09-01264, 2010 WL
4809114, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2010).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id. at *2.
248
Id. at *4.
249
See id. at *6.
250
See, e.g., Pires v. Pires, Nos. 02 MISC. 282083(CWT), 02E 033 PP(CWT), 0433 CV
0547(CWT), 02-SP-00569, 2009 WL 3067070 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 25, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, remanded in part, 2011 Mass. App. Div. 23 (Dist. Ct. 2011).
238
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The combination of a confidential relationship and advantage taking
also played a role in the Michigan case of Fick v. Fick.251 Plaintiff, the
wife, and defendant, the husband, were married in 1994.252 The wife was
severely injured in 1996, and the husband assumed responsibility for her
financial transactions.253 Eventually the husband influenced her to sign
both a mortgage agreement and quitclaim deed resulting in his sole
ownership of their home.254 He also divorced her without her knowledge.255
Although there was no direct evidence of the type found in Odorizzi, the
confidential relationship and the deception by the defendant were enough to
establish undue influence.256
Just as a perceived unfairness may influence a court to find that undue
influence is involved, the opposite is also true: Perceptions of fairness seem
to defeat the same claims. In In re Estate of Jones, daughters of a deceased
couple claimed that, after the husband’s death, the couple’s sons had used
undue influence to convince the widow to enter into agreements that
favored the sons at the expense of the daughters.257 It was determined that
the relationship between the mother and sons was confidential.258 Here,
however, the court found that the existence of a confidential relationship
was not enough to shift the burden to the sons to show there was no undue
influence.259 Principally, the court noted that the exchange between the
sons and their mother was a “fair bargain.”260
In a recent case involving a completely different context—child
custody—it appears that fairness also played a role.261 Here the mother
complained that undue influence resulted in an agreement to joint
custody.262 The agreement was a result of voluntary mediation during
which the mother consulted with her sister, who was a family law
attorney.263 Nevertheless, it was clear that she was subjected to repeated

251
Fick v. Fick, Docket No. 274284, 2008 WL 3540257 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2008) (per
curiam).
252
Id. at *1.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id. at *1–2.
257
In re Estate of Jones, 287 P.3d 610, 611 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
258
Id. at 616 n.7.
259
Id. at 615–18.
260
Id. at 616.
261
In re Alden, 159 Wash. App. 1008, 2010 WL 5298828 (2010) (unpublished table decision).
262
Id. at *3.
263
Id.
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phone calls by the husband insisting that she sign.264 There was no
suggestion that the father was unfit to have custody.265 More importantly,
the agreement awarded the mother significantly more custody than the
father.266 Neither the process of reaching the agreement nor the outcome
suggested that her will was overpowered.267
Finally, in Kenton v. Foster, the seller of a home became unhappy with
the contract once she found a buyer willing to pay more.268 In addition to
the sales price, she was also to receive a “place to live for the earlier of
seven years or until she received her next installment from the California
lottery.”269 She claimed that she agreed to the original sales price as a result
of undue influence.270 She was evidently under some financial pressure
while waiting for her lottery payment.271 There was no confidential
relationship between the buyer and seller, nor was there any evidence of
domination.272 Finally, the court observed, although the selling price may
have been below market value, the reasons for accepting that price were
clear.273
Undue influence actually seems to be a more viable method of
addressing inequities between the parties than either capacity or duress.
Unlike capacity, there is typically not a medical condition involved.274
And, unlike duress, there are not several individual elements that must be
proven.275 Plus, although it is not clear why this is the case, undue
influence appears to give rise to less discussion about the sophistication of
the party seeking to avoid the contract. One possibility is that duress hinges
on the lack of a reasonable alternative, which can be viewed as a question
of what the party should have known to consider, while this is not part of

264

Id. at *1, *5.
See id. at *1–2.
266
See id. at *1 (“The agreed upon residential schedule gave [mother] custody 114 hours and [father]
54 hours on some weeks and, on alternating weeks, gave [mother] 93 hours and [father] 75 hours.”). But
see id. at *5 (“[T]he residential schedule roughly divides residential time equally between the
parties . . . .”).
267
See id. at *3–4.
268
Kenton v. Foster, No. CV-04-2005-PCT-PGR, 2008 WL 4700626, at *1–4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 23,
2008).
269
Id. at *1.
270
Id. at *8.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id. Sewage had filled the “downstairs” of the home, and there were no utilities when she sold the
house to the original buyer for less than market value. Id. at *1, *8.
274
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1981); see also supra Part VI.A.
275
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175; see also supra Part VI.B.
265
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the undue influence analysis.276 Perhaps most important is the finding of a
confidential relationship. If a person enters into a confidential relationship,
the idea of an arms-length bargain does not apply.277 In a sense, the
influenced party has a right to expect the contracting party not to seek most
or all of the benefit of the bargain.278 Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to
infer that, at least in recent decisions, courts are anxious to invoke undue
influence. In this sample, however, it was more likely to be relied on than
capacity or duress.
VII. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: UNCONSCIONABILITY AND
STATUTORY MEASURES
Based on this survey, it is safest to say that imbalance in the benefit of
the bargain plays only a minor role in cases based on capacity, duress, and
undue influence. Courts are more inclined to look for relatively objective
evidence.279 In some cases, status and background may be as influential as
the actual bargain. Perhaps wary of running afoul of the rule that adequacy
of consideration is not required, courts consider even a very uneven
distribution of the benefit of the bargain as only evidence that there was a
problem with consent.
Does this mean that distributive matters are unimportant in American
contract law? Probably not. In fact, it may be that what would be
considered under the doctrines of capacity, duress, and undue influence are
today dealt with by the doctrine of unconscionability or by statutory
measures.
A. Unconscionability
In Part I, it was noted that contracts which reflected unfairness are more
likely to be assessed under the doctrine of unconscionability. Given the
lack of significant evidence that courts use capacity, duress, and undue
influence to actively address distributive issues, this possibility seemed

276
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (duress), with id. § 177 (undue
influence).
277
See, e.g., Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. 1981) (“When the relationship between the
parties to an agreement is one of trust and confidence, the normal arm’s length bargaining is not
assumed . . . .”).
278
See id. (“[O]verreaching by the dominant party for his benefit permits the aggrieved party to
rescind the transaction. This is so because the presence of a confidential relationship negates the
assumption that each party is acting in his own best interest.” (citations omitted)).
279
See supra Part VI.
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more promising. In order to test this explanation, I compared instances in
which the Second Restatement sections on capacity, duress, and undue
influence were cited to instances in which section 208 of the Second
Restatement and section 2-302 of the U.C.C., which address
unconscionability, were cited. In the period from 2003 to mid-2013, there
were fifty-five cases that cited the Second Restatement sections on capacity,
duress, or undue influence.280 In the same period, the unconscionability
sections of the Second Restatement and the U.C.C. were cited 236 times.281
Without a period for comparison, it cannot be concluded that
unconscionability has replaced capacity, duress, and undue influence.
Consequently, the period from 1980 through 1989 was selected for
comparison. Using the same database and search terms, the Second
Restatement sections on capacity, duress, and undue influence were cited
eighty-two times.282 On the other hand, citations to the relevant sections on
unconscionability were cited seventy-five times.283 The absolute numbers
probably tell us little, and any inferences should be made only with great
caution. Nevertheless, one interpretation of the relative numbers is that
unconscionability may be replacing the traditional doctrines of capacity,
duress, and undue influence.
If this were the whole story, the ascendency of unconscionability seems
obvious.
Complicating matters, however, is that many of the
unconscionability cases arise in the context of compulsory arbitration. Of
the 236 citations to unconscionability in the most recent period, 89 were in
conjunction with arbitration clauses.284 This is approximately 38%. In the
earlier period, eleven cases cited unconscionability in the context of
arbitration.285 This is but 15%. The general distrust of arbitration by courts
has been well documented,286 although recent events indicate that this is not
a position shared by the United States Supreme Court.287
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after 2002” and “unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 2002”).
282
Id. (search “capacity & contract & restatement & s15 & after 1979 & before 1990,” “duress &
contract & restatement & s175 & after 1979 & before 1990,” and “‘undue influence’ & contract &
restatement & s177 & after 1979 & before 1990”).
283
Id. (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & after 1979 & before 1990” and
“unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 1979 & before 1990”).
284
Id. (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & after 2002”; then filter the results
for “arbitration”; and search “unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 2002”; then filter the
results for “arbitration”).
285
Id. (search “unconscionable & contract & restatement & s208 & after 1979 & before 1990”; then
filter the results for “arbitration”; and search “unconscionable & contract & UCC & s2-302 & after 1979
& before 1990”; then filter the results for “arbitration”).
286
See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
281

2015]

Defects in Consent and Dividing the Benefit of the Bargain

227

There are a number of possible interpretations. Although causation
cannot be established, it is clear that the growth in arbitration is correlated
with increased attempts to invoke unconscionability. Does this, in itself,
signal that courts are now more willing to address unfairness under the
banner of unconscionability in general? This seems likely, but one would
have to separate the impact of increased reliance on arbitration as a variable
from other factors that may explain the rise in reliance on unconscionability
more generally.288 Nevertheless, more research on this point is warranted.
B. Statutory Measures
This study has focused on case law and the responsiveness of courts to
contracts in which the benefit of the bargain favors one party over another
to an extreme degree. This is hardly a complete picture of the methods used
in American law to respond either to defects in consent or directly to
unfairness. For example, an alternative to duress and undue influences is a
federally established “cooling-off” period for some sales made in a person’s
home.289 The goal is to allow reflection after the conclusion of what may
have been a high-pressure sales pitch.290 This is hardly a pervasive
safeguard and, in fact, would not be applied in any of the cases encountered
in this project.
At the outset, this Article discussed the gap between consent and
preferences and how that relates to defects in consent. A great deal of
statutory law is designed to respond to the gap through disclosure
requirements, which can assist in more rational decision making.
Disclosures can range from warnings about health hazards to loan terms and
nutritional information.291 These requirements increase the amount of
available information and lower the costs for contracting parties seeking to
discover information. With this information, manifestations of consent may
be more aligned with actual preferences.
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In many instances, rather than address consent as such, the law goes
directly to what concerns us about defects in consent—the actual outcome.
For example, in some states, price ceilings are placed on certain goods
during times of emergency.292 Again, the purpose is to avoid an extreme
imbalance in the division of the benefit of the bargain when one party has
little bargaining power.293 Usury laws that place limits on the interest rates
that may be demanded by lenders also tend to directly offset what some
would regard as exploitation flowing from unequal bargaining power.294
Required warranties and the potential for tort claims based on product
liability can also be seen as part of the process of encouraging fair terms in
exchanges.
VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
What can ultimately be said about American law and defects in
consent? First, aside from statutory law, defects are only addressed when
individuals ask for them to be addressed, and it is likely that there is a
socioeconomic bias with respect to who does ask. When questions of
capacity, duress, or undue influence do make it before a court, perceived
unfairness is one way in which the benefit of the bargain can influence the
outcome. On the other hand, the sample drawn here composed of relatively
recent cases suggests that courts are reluctant to intervene on the basis of
any of these theories, especially if the background or status of the
complaining party suggests that they were capable of resisting the
pressures. The principal exceptions are those in which the parties have a
confidential relationship. Intervention, when it does occur, seems more
likely to fall under the rubric of unconscionability.
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